(পূর্ববর্তী পর্বের পর)
১৯৭১ সালের ৬ই মার্চ তত্কালীন পূর্ব পাকিস্তানে স্বাধিকার আন্দোলন দানা বেধে ওঠার পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের ন্যাশনাল সিকিউরিটি কাউন্সিল, পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রনালয়, সিআইএ ও আর্মি এর সমন্বয়ে গঠিত সিনিয়র রিভিউ কমিটির এক গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সভা অনুস্ঠিত হয়। এই মিটিং এ বঙ্গবন্ধুর ৭ই মার্চের সম্ভাব্য ভাষন, ২৫শে মার্চের এসেম্বলী আহবান, পূর্ব-পাকিস্তানের স্বাধিকার আন্দোলন ও সংঘাত সামরিক উপায়ে মোকাবেলা এবং ভারতের ভূমিকা নিয়ে বিশদ আলোচনা হয়।

সভায় সভাপতিত্ব করেন তত্কালীন মার্কিন পররাষ্ট্রমন্ত্রী হেনরী কিসিন্জার। সভায় এ ছাড়াও পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রনালয়ের উর্ধতন কর্মকর্তাবৃন্দ, সিআইএ এবং ন্যাশনাল সিকিউরিটি কাউন্সিল এর কর্মকর্তারা উপস্থিত ছিলেন। সভাটি অনুষ্ঠিত হয়েছিল ৬ই মার্চ ১৯৭১ হোয়াইট হাউসের সিচুয়েশন রুমে। সভার কার্যবিবরণী পাঠ করলে তদানীন্তন মার্কিন করকারের ভূমিকা সম্পর্কে সম্যক ধারণা লাভ করা যায়। আমি তিন পর্বে এই গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সভার কার্যবিবরণী আপনাদের সাথে শেয়ার করছি। আজ থাকল ৩য় ও শেষ পর্ব ।

Mr. Kissinger: The President will be very reluctant to do anything that Yahya could interpret as a personal affront. When we talk about trying to discourage West Pakistan intervention, we mean try to get another country with a history of concern in the area to do it. Would they do it in both our names?

Mr. Johnson: We're not at that point yet. We've just begun to look for someone to do it, if necessary. How it is done and the degree of our association will be decided at the time. Our objective is to discourage the use of force.

Mr. Kissinger: Will this mean that Yahya is through anyway?

Mr. Van Hollen: Not necessarily. He could still remain as President with Bhutto wielding all effective political power.

Mr. Kissinger: Yahya had counted on being in control because of the divisions in the National Assembly.

Mr. Van Hollen: Of course, the elections seriously eroded his position.

Mr. Kissinger: He had been able to play off Bhutto against East Pakistan. If East Pakistan becomes an independent state, Bhutto is in effective control in the West.

Mr. Van Hollen: Yahya will continue to represent the military establishment which is a significant political force in West Pakistan. He may retain some limited residual power.

Mr. Kissinger: In any event, we can't neglect him.

Mr. Johnson: No.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's keep that in mind.

Mr. Johnson: It would be most unwise to do anything to prejudice our relations with Yahya. To whatever degree he remains and has power, we should do what we can to help him.

Mr. Kissinger: Would it make any difference if we suggested to West Pakistan that the use of force would be unwise? You understand I don't mind having another country taking the rap.

Mr. Johnson: When we say "discourage" or "participate in discouraging" we don't mean pound the table and tell them they can't do it. We mean discuss it with them.

Mr. Helms: We don't want to get into a family fight.

Mr. Kissinger: If we could go in mildly as a friend to say we think it's a bad idea, it wouldn't be so bad. But if the country is breaking up, they won't be likely to receive such a message calmly. If we can get the British to do it, I wish them well!

Mr. Johnson: There has been no decision on our part to do anything. This is the purpose of our talks with the British.

Mr. Kissinger: If we should make an approach, we might give them an alibi, so that Bhutto could say that the Americans, by warning them against the use of force, kept West Pakistan from restoring the unity of the country.

Mr. Johnson: That's right.

Mr. Kissinger: It is essential that we discuss this with the British.

Mr. Johnson: We can't reach a decision now on how to proceed. If we can get someone else to take the lead, okay. If not, we will have to decide whether we want to do anything. I am not proposing we do anything, but it is a course of action we may have to consider.

Mr. Kissinger: I think we all see the pros and cons clearly. Alex (Johnson) and I will talk after his talks with the British. Every department will be consulted before we make any move. We will also have a chance to take the issue before the President if necessary.

Mr. Van Hollen: The British may be very reluctant to do anything. It does have some advantages, though, because the Pakistanis are not as suspicious of the British as they are of us and the British odor in Pakistan is not bad now because of their attitude toward the recent hijacking.

Mr. Kissinger: In the highly emotional atmosphere of West Pakistan under the circumstances, I wonder whether sending the American Ambassador in to argue against moving doesn't buy us the worst of everything. Will our doing so make the slightest difference? I can't imagine that they give a damn what we think.

Mr. Helms: I agree. My visceral reaction is to keep our distance as long as we can.

Mr. Kissinger: Alex (Johnson) will talk to the British and we will all consult tomorrow-unless, of course, Mujib's speech is conciliatory. What if they declare their independence? Will we get an immediate recognition request?

Mr. Johnson: Probably, but we don't have to rush. We can see what Mujib says in his approach to us. We shouldn't be the first to recognize. We will want to consult with the British first since they have interests in both East and West Pakistan.

Mr. Van Hollen: The Japanese do too; also, possibly the West Germans and the French.

Mr. Johnson: We will want to recognize eventually but not be the first.

Mr. Van Hollen: Of course, if the parting is amicable and we get a request for recognition, it would be okay.

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose the request for recognition comes to our Consul General in Dacca. What will he say?

Mr. Van Hollen: He will refer to Washington.

Mr. Johnson: I'll tell them so this afternoon, not that I think he would do anything else.
Mr. Kissinger: Option 3/9/ suggests we consult with the Indians in case a military situation develops. I wonder whether we should do that. I can see that, if there is a threat of Indian military intervention, we might wish to advise them that we think it unwise.

/9/ Of the contingency study.

Mr. Van Hollen: The prospect of Indian intervention is very slim in the early stages.

Mr. Kissinger: I question too great activity on our part. We can't win anything from it, and some Pakistani leaders would be delighted to stick us with it. I wonder whether we should intervene with them or with the Indians.

Mr. Johnson: There is a case to be made for massive inaction.

Mr. Helms: Absolutely.

Mr. Kissinger: I'm just going through the options. The possibility of Chinese military intervention seems so unlikely.

Mr. Johnson: The paper dismisses it.

Mr. Kissinger: I assume the mention of international diplomatic intervention was put in for intellectual symmetry.

Mr. Van Hollen: That is far down the road. If a real blood-bath develops, comparable to the Biafra situation, we may want to review the picture. In such case, international attention could be focussed on the problem, but this is a long way ahead.

Mr. Johnson: In any event, we wouldn't threaten West Pakistan with any sanctions.

Mr. Kissinger: Or call our Ambassador home for consultation.

Mr. Johnson: Our Ambassador is in Bangkok for some medical problem.

Mr. Kissinger: Who is our ChargŽ?

Mr. Saunders: Sid Sober. He's a good man.

Mr. Johnson: Yes. We don't need to rush the Ambassador back.

Mr. Kissinger: I was really only joking. We'll be in touch tomorrow.

Mr. Johnson: I'll get something out to our people today giving them our thinking. When will we know about the speech tomorrow?

Mr. Noyes: About 5:00 a.m.

Mr. Saunders: There is a ten-hour time difference. We should know fairly early in the morning. Yahya's speech of yesterday was on the CBS 8:00 a.m. news today.

Mr. Johnson: Our Operations Center will be on the alert for the speech.

Mr. Kissinger: We'll check with each other as soon as we know about the speech-with a view to taking no action!

Mr. Helms: What's the situation at the Technical University (in Ankara) today?

Mr. Kissinger: What about the four Airmen? Do they still think they are in the University?

Mr. Saunders: We have no word. The Embassy doesn't think they are in the University and the Turks have widened their search-they went into 100 private homes last night looking for them. The demonstrations have stopped, though, and things are quieter today.

সভায় নিম্নোক্ত সিদ্ধান্তগুলি গৃহীত হয়।
It was agreed to:
-discuss the situation with the British to see if they would take the lead in an approach to West Pakistan to discourage the use of force, if it should become necessary;

-advise our missions at Dacca and Islamabad of our thinking and instruct Dacca, if they receive an approach from Mujib on recognition of a separate East Pakistan regime, to say nothing and refer it to Washington;

-consult by telephone on Sunday, March 7 following word on Mujib's speech

পাদটীকা
তথ্যসূত্র (Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting, prepared by Brigadier General Devol Brett of OSD, is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Jan-Jul) 1971. )

সভায় উপস্থিত সদস্যবৃন্দ

Chairman-Henry A. Kissinger
State
U. Alexis Johnson
Christopher Van Hollen
William Spengler
Thomas Thornton
Defense
James S. Noyes
Brig. Gen. Devol Brett

CIA
Richard Helms
David H. Blee

JCS
Vice Adm. John Weinel
Col. James Connell

NSC Staff
Col. Richard Kennedy
Harold Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
Jeanne W. Davis