১৯৭১ সালের ৬ই মার্চ তত্কালীন পূর্ব পাকিস্তানে স্বাধিকার আন্দোলন দানা বেধে ওঠার পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের ন্যাশনাল সিকিউরিটি কাউন্সিল, পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রনালয়, সিআইএ ও আর্মি এর সমন্বয়ে গঠিত সিনিয়র রিভিউ কমিটির এক গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সভা অনুস্ঠিত হয়। এই মিটিং এ বঙ্গবন্ধুর ৭ই মার্চের সম্ভাব্য ভাষন, ২৫শে মার্চের এসেম্বলী আহবান, পূর্ব-পাকিস্তানের স্বাধিকার আন্দোলন ও সংঘাত সামরিক উপায়ে মোকাবেলা এবং ভারতের ভূমিকা নিয়ে বিশদ আলোচনা হয়।

সভায় সভাপতিত্ব করেন তত্কালীন মার্কিন পররাষ্ট্রমন্ত্রী হেনরী কিসিন্জার। সভায় এ ছাড়াও পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রনালয়ের উর্ধতন কর্মকর্তাবৃন্দ, সিআইএ এবং ন্যাশনাল সিকিউরিটি কাউন্সিল এর কর্মকর্তারা উপস্থিত ছিলেন। সভার কার্যবিবরণী পাঠ করলে তদানীন্তন মার্কিন করকারের ভূমিকা সম্পর্কে সম্যক ধারণা লাভ করা যায়। আমি তিন পর্বে এই গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সভার কার্যবিবরণী আপনাদের সাথে শেয়ার করবো। আজ থাকল প্রথম পর্ব।


Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS
It was agreed to:
-discuss the situation with the British to see if they would take the lead in an approach to West Pakistan to discourage the use of force, if it should become necessary;

-advise our missions at Dacca and Islamabad of our thinking and instruct Dacca, if they receive an approach from Mujib on recognition of a separate East Pakistan regime, to say nothing and refer it to Washington;

-consult by telephone on Sunday, March 7 following word on Mujib's speech./2/

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we might have a brief discussion of what may be ahead and what our basic choices may be. I assume we will know something tomorrow.

Mr. Johnson: We have a good interagency contingency paper.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, it's a very good paper.

Mr. Johnson: We're already on page 7 of that paper so far as events go. I would like to make two points. First, this is not an East-West, or a US-Soviet, or a US-Indian confrontation. The US, USSR and India all have an interest in the continued unity of Pakistan and have nothing to gain from a break-up. Second, we have no control over the events which will determine the outcome, and very little influence. We will know better what the issues are tomorrow after Mujibur Rahman's speech. Yahya's speech today was described by our Embassy as a mixture of sugar and bile. If the issue is postponed for a few days, we don't face any immediate problem. If Mujib should come to us and tell us he plans to make a unilateral declaration of independence and ask what our attitude would be, we would then face the issue of what to say. If Yahya carries out his declaration on the use of force against East Pakistan, we would have to decide what attitude to adopt. The judgement of all of us is that with the number of troops available to Yahya (a total of 20,000, with 12,000 combat troops) and a hostile East Pakistan population of 75 million, the result would be a blood-bath with no hope of West Pakistan reestablishing control over East Pakistan. In this event, we would be interested in bringing about a cessation of hostilities, but the question of whether we or others should take the lead remains to be seen. We are talking with the British this afternoon about the situation. Mujib has unparalleled political control, capturing 160 of the 162 seats up for grabs in the last election. And he is friendly toward the US. In West Pakistan, Bhutto is almost unparalleledly unfriendly to the US. While we have maintained a posture of hoping the country can be brought together and its unity preserved, the chances of doing so now are extremely slight. It is only a question of time and circumstances as to how they will split, and to what degree the split is complete or may be papered over in some vague confederal scheme.

Page 7 of the contingency study introduced the question of what the U.S. posture would be if the secession of East Pakistan appeared to be imminent.

In a radio address on March 6, Yahya announced that he had decided to convene the National Assembly on March 25. He concluded the speech by warning that as long as he was in charge of the armed forces he would defend the integrity of Pakistan. (Telegram 1957 from Islamabad, March 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL PAK) The Embassy's comments on the speech were reported in telegram 1963 from Islamabad, March 6.

I plan to send something out today to give our people in Dacca and Islamabad the flavor of our thinking in terms of the pros and cons, and to instruct Dacca, if they are approached by Mujib, to stall and refer to Washington. We can then make a decision on our reply in the light of the circumstances at the time. In general, we would like to see unity preserved. If it cannot be, we would like to see the split take place with the least possible bloodshed or disorder. If Mujib approaches us, we will have to walk a tightrope between making him think we are giving him the cold shoulder and not encouraging him to move toward a split if any hope remains for a compromise.


Mr. Van Hollen: There are three possibilities for Mujib tomorrow: a unilateral declaration of independence; something just short of that-possibly a suggestion for two separate constitutions; or acceptance of Yahya's proposal that the National Assembly meet on March 25.

Mr. Kissinger: But doesn't Mujib control the Assembly?

Mr. Van Hollen: Yes, but Yahya controls its convening.

Mr. Kissinger: Why wouldn't the convening of the National Assembly on March 25 be acceptable to East Pakistan? They control the Assembly and nothing can pass without them.

Mr. Van Hollen: They may interpret it as another stalling tactic by Yahya.

Mr. Kissinger: If they accept the proposal for an Assembly meeting, we have no foreign policy problem.

Mr. Johnson: I agree; the temperature drops.

Mr. Kissinger: What would be the motive for a declaration of independence?

Mr. Van Hollen: There has been movement in East Pakistan in that direction which was intensified by Yahya's postponement of the National Assembly meeting that was scheduled for last Wednesday./7/ Also, they have interpreted Yahya's speech yesterday as being particularly hardline, blaming Mujib for the situation and threatening the use of force.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree that force won't work.

Mr. Van Hollen: Yes, but they might try.

Mr. Helms: To coin a phrase, Yahya's attitude is that he did not become President of Pakistan to preside over the dissolution of the Pakistan state.

Mr. Kissinger: What force do they have?

Mr. Helms: 20,000 troops.

Mr. Kissinger: Would East Pakistan resist? What is their population?

Mr. Johnson: 75 million, and they would resist. Also, West Pakistan would not be allowed to overfly India.

Mr. Kissinger: It would be impossible. They would have to reinforce by ship.

(চলবে)
পাদটীকা :

তথ্য সূত্র (Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting, prepared by Brigadier General Devol Brett of OSD, is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Jan-Jul) 1971. )

সভায় উপস্থিত সদস্যবৃন্দ
Chairman-Henry A. Kissinger
State
U. Alexis Johnson
Christopher Van Hollen
William Spengler
Thomas Thornton
Defense
James S. Noyes
Brig. Gen. Devol Brett

CIA
Richard Helms
David H. Blee

JCS
Vice Adm. John Weinel
Col. James Connell

NSC Staff
Col. Richard Kennedy
Harold Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
Jeanne W. Davis