(পূর্ববর্তী পর্বের পর)
১৯৭১ সালের ৬ই মার্চ তত্কালীন পূর্ব পাকিস্তানে স্বাধিকার আন্দোলন দানা বেধে ওঠার পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের ন্যাশনাল সিকিউরিটি কাউন্সিল, পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রনালয়, সিআইএ ও আর্মি এর সমন্বয়ে গঠিত সিনিয়র রিভিউ কমিটির এক গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সভা অনুস্ঠিত হয়। এই মিটিং এ বঙ্গবন্ধুর ৭ই মার্চের সম্ভাব্য ভাষন, ২৫শে মার্চের এসেম্বলী আহবান, পূর্ব-পাকিস্তানের স্বাধিকার আন্দোলন ও সংঘাত সামরিক উপায়ে মোকাবেলা এবং ভারতের ভূমিকা নিয়ে বিশদ আলোচনা হয়।

সভায় সভাপতিত্ব করেন তত্কালীন মার্কিন পররাষ্ট্রমন্ত্রী হেনরী কিসিন্জার। সভায় এ ছাড়াও পররাষ্ট্র মন্ত্রনালয়ের উর্ধতন কর্মকর্তাবৃন্দ, সিআইএ এবং ন্যাশনাল সিকিউরিটি কাউন্সিল এর কর্মকর্তারা উপস্থিত ছিলেন। সভাটি অনুষ্ঠিত হয়েছিল ৬ই মার্চ ১৯৭১ হোয়াইট হাউসের সিচুয়েশন রুমে। সভার কার্যবিবরণী পাঠ করলে তদানীন্তন মার্কিন করকারের ভূমিকা সম্পর্কে সম্যক ধারণা লাভ করা যায়। আমি তিন পর্বে এই গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সভার কার্যবিবরণী আপনাদের সাথে শেয়ার করছি। আজ থাকল ২য় পর্ব ।

Mr. Kissinger: Would East Pakistan resist? What is their population?

Mr. Johnson: 75 million, and they would resist. Also, West Pakistan would not be allowed to overfly India.

Mr. Kissinger: It would be impossible. They would have to reinforce by ship.

Mr. Johnson: They have some C-130's which could fly around India by refueling in Ceylon.

Mr. Kissinger: Ceylon wouldn't let them, would they?

Mr. Van Hollen: They do it now, but they might not if circumstances should change.

Mr. Noyes: India would put pressure on Ceylon to refuse.

Mr. Johnson: They could use their jet transports.

Mr. Noyes: They only have 11 of limited capacity.

Mr. Kissinger: They would have to have some logistics back-up.

Mr. Noyes: They have three ships which could move 8000 men in a week's time.

Mr. Van Hollen: Despite all the problems, our mission in Islamabad estimates that Yahya is prepared to use force.

Mr. Noyes: They have 15,000 troops in Dacca.

Mr. Kissinger: You mean 15,000 of their 20,000 troops are in Dacca? They might just want to hold Dacca.

Mr. Johnson: This is not a situation which would be resolved by the use of force.

Mr. Kissinger: Doesn't contingency 3/8/ get us three weeks, if not more. If the matter goes to the National Assembly we should have several months to study it.

/8/ Contingency 3 of the contingency study cited in footnote 3 above outlined a U.S. response to a situation in which Pakistan rejected a unilateral declaration of independence and attempted to put down the secession by force.

Mr. Johnson: In those circumstances we would have no immediate foreign policy problem.

Mr. Kissinger: If an autonomous situation develops-possibly two constitutions with some vague confederal links-would we be required to make some immediate decisions?

Mr. Van Hollen: It would depend on the West Pakistan reaction. It would probably buy us time. Something short of a unilateral declaration of independence might be accepted by West Pakistan. In that event, they would not use force.

Mr. Kissinger: How would two separate constitutions work? The National Assembly wouldn't meet? Or would meet and draft two separate constitutions?

Mr. Van Hollen: It wouldn't have to be done by the National Assemblies; the country could be operated by the provincial assemblies. The Provincial Assembly in East Pakistan could draft their constitution. Mujib in the East and Bhutto in the West would wield effective power.

Mr. Kissinger: Would East Pakistan conduct its own foreign policy?

Mr. Van Hollen: That's a moot point.

Mr. Kissinger: In any event, that's not our problem. If West Pakistan accepts a solution in which each part conducts its own foreign relations, we would go along. If West Pakistan doesn't accept such a solution, we will have to decide whether to go along and grant recognition to East Pakistan. There would be no need for us to take a stand on autonomy. If they declare independence, we face the recognition question. If autonomy is rejected, we face the problem of our positions on the use of force. In other words, we have to face the question on the use of force in independence and autonomy. We face the problem of recognition only if they declare independence. Is that a fair statement? What are your views on this?

Mr. Johnson: On autonomy, if West Pakistan does not accept that solution and seeks to use force, I think we would want to discourage the use of force. We would do the same in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence.

Mr. Kissinger: If I may be the devil's advocate, why should we say anything?

Mr. Johnson: If the West Pakistanis use force, there will be a bloodbath or, at least, a situation of great turmoil in East Pakistan. If it is quickly over, there would be no problem. But if it continues, there would be problems. The Indians, and possibly others, might feel impelled to intervene if it continued. In the short run, probably not.

Mr. Kissinger: What would we do to discourage the use of force? Tell Yahya we don't favor it?

Mr. Johnson: We would first go to the British to try to get them to take the lead. We shouldn't take the lead.

Mr. Helms: Amen!

Mr. Kissinger: Intervention would almost certainly be self-defeating.

Mr. Johnson: We have no control over developments and very little influence.

Mr. Kissinger: When is Mujib's statement?

Mr. Helms: Tomorrow at 1600 GMT.

Mr. Van Hollen: Another reason for our not taking the lead is that West Pakistan is very suspicious that we are supporting a separate East Pakistan state. If we tell Yahya to call off the use of force, it will merely fuel this suspicion.

Mr. Kissinger: The President will be very reluctant to do anything that Yahya could interpret as a personal affront. When we talk about trying to discourage West Pakistan intervention, we mean try to get another country with a history of concern in the area to do it. Would they do it in both our names?


পাদটীকা :

তথ্য সূত্র (Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting, prepared by Brigadier General Devol Brett of OSD, is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Jan-Jul) 1971. )

সভায় উপস্থিত সদস্যবৃন্দ
Chairman-Henry A. Kissinger
State
U. Alexis Johnson
Christopher Van Hollen
William Spengler
Thomas Thornton
Defense
James S. Noyes
Brig. Gen. Devol Brett

CIA
Richard Helms
David H. Blee

JCS
Vice Adm. John Weinel
Col. James Connell

NSC Staff
Col. Richard Kennedy
Harold Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
Jeanne W. Davis